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TENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE 
RESPONSE 
 
FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, FURTHER 
REFLECTIONS*
 
DAVID SCHEFFER**
 
Esteemed colleagues—Isaiah prophesized, “And the loftiness of 
man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of man shall be made 
low . . . .”1 That prophecy has borne truth in our collective 
experience since the end of the Cold War. If we have learned 
anything as international lawyers during these turbulent years, it 
must be that the darkest and most evil elements of the human 
character can overwhelm all logic and argument to bring each of 
us—regardless of character or brilliance—to his or her knees. That 
reality is not difficult to grasp when one witnesses the butchered 
victims of a massacre on a hillside in Africa. It compels the deepest 
sense of humility and yet inspires the belief that the law—that sacred 
trust our predecessors crafted—and the victims of atrocity crimes 
deserve better from us. 
 * Distinguished Discussant for Tenth Annual Grotius Lecture Series, 
delivered to the 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law, Washington, DC, April 9, 2008. 
 **  The author is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and  
Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University 
School of Law.  He is a member of the New York, District of Columbia, and 
Supreme Court Bars and formerly served as the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War 
Crimes Issues (1997-2001). 
 1. Isaiah 2:17 (King James). 
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Prince Zeid delivered that message this afternoon with the 
eloquence and insight for which he has come to be so highly 
respected during the last decade. When he spoke of how one 
individual—Richard Goldstone—acted courageously to indict both 
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in those desperate days of early 
1995,2 and thus helped change the dynamic in the Balkans, he was 
unwittingly describing the type of person he himself represents. 
Prince Zeid, with persistent, steady leadership, has acted with a 
different kind of courage in the service of Jordan, and of 
international criminal law. He was not obligated to plunge into the 
muddy waters of our profession or lead the Assembly of States 
Parties of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) during its initial 
three years. He could have been a conventional distinguished 
diplomat from the Middle East. Instead, he made and continues to 
make enormous contributions to the pursuit of international justice 
and peacekeeping and we are privileged to have him on the world 
stage. Mark my words, sitting before you is a future Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
I intend to focus on four issues in Prince Zeid’s lecture: the role of 
lawyers in the service of their nation within the realm of political 
expediency; the significance of the victims; amnesties; and the end of 
impunity for atrocity crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and aggression. 
Prince Zeid posits a central question: whether lawyers are 
consigned to do the dirty work “for the love of country” or on behalf 
of political expediency to the detriment of the law, and particularly 
of international criminal law.3 The best example of this point is the 
resurrection of criminal conduct that many of us thought was 
obliterated by our legal system years ago. Now we are burdened by 
 2. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-1, Initial 
Indictment, ¶¶ 47-54 (July 24, 1995) (charging Radovan Karadzic and Ratko 
Mladic with genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws of war). 
See also RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR 
CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 101-03 (2000) (describing the intense political pressures 
facing Justice Goldstone in moving forward with the Karadzic and Mladic 
indictments in accordance with his role as an independent prosecutor). 
 3. See Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of America, Address, For Love of Country 
and International Criminal Law, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647 (2009) (outlining 
the issues arising when ideas of identity and nationality conflict with 
responsibilities under international law). 
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allegations of torture and cruel and degrading treatment of detainees, 
and by the legal rationales for such practices, inflicted “for the love 
of country” during the so-called war on terror.4
We have exhibits for the ages in Professor John Yoo, formerly of 
the Department of Justice (“DoJ”), Office of Legal Counsel; federal 
judge Jay Bybee, who was Yoo’s boss at DoJ; David Addington, 
former counsel and chief of staff to the Vice President Dick Cheney; 
former Attorney General and former White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales; former Department of Defense General Counsel William 
James Haynes; and the Bush Administration’s lingering futile 
nominee to head the Office of Legal Counsel, Steven Bradbury.5
 4. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND 
THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES 3-5 (2008) (chronicling the development 
and circulation of the Haynes memo, which provided the legal basis for the use of 
interrogation techniques contradictory to international law and military practice); 
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1685 (2005) (noting that the legal basis for using 
torture as an interrogation technique was recognized by government officials and 
prominent legal scholars, all of whom implied that either the Geneva Conventions 
did not apply to those captured during the war on terror or that torture without risk 
to life or health was an acceptable interrogation technique); JORDAN J. PAUST, 
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE 
"WAR" ON TERROR 23-24 (2007) (characterizing the actions of government 
lawyers and officials in recommending and authorizing alternative interrogation 
techniques as willful violations of the Geneva Conventions and, ultimately, as war 
crimes); JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT 
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 189-191 (2007) (recognizing that the 
potentialities of inaction drive national security officials to act “aggressively and 
preemptively” when faced with terrorist threats, regardless of the implications of 
their actions). See also Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential 
Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 240 (2007) (underscoring CIA concern that 
interrogation techniques such as water boarding would subject CIA personnel to 
penalties under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, which implemented the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture). But see Symposium, Extraordinary Powers in 
Ordinary Times: Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the Global 
War on Terror, 87 B. U. L. REV. 427, 466 (2007) (noting that although physicians, 
lawyers, and military officers are especially well-suited to prevent torture, thus far 
those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law in the war on 
terror have not been stripped of their rights to practice as professionals). 
 5. Professor John Yoo prepared a legal memorandum urging the Bush 
Administration to reconsider its “recognition of the rules imposed by the Geneva 
Convention” with regard to the interrogation of the Al Qaeda and Taliban 
prisoners. Waldron, supra note 4, at 1684. While serving in the Department of 
Justice, Jay S. Bybee prepared a legal memorandum recommending that the Bush 
Administration’s definition of torture be limited to “the infliction of the sort of 
extreme pain that would be associated with death or organ failure.” Id. at 1685. 
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None of these individuals had distinguished backgrounds in 
international law and yet each one practiced within the complex and 
rapidly developing fields of international humanitarian and criminal 
law. The public record appears to show that these lawyers—perhaps 
with honest but grossly misguided intentions—did exactly what was 
required of them to fulfill the expedient objectives of their political 
masters.6 Political and military leaders and intelligence officials 
needed legal cover and they got it with memoranda authored by mid-
level lawyers whose superiors marveled at the simplicity of the 
analysis which blithely ignored precedents of established federal and 
international law. Other government and military lawyers resisted the 
temptations of political expediency, and they deserve recognition for 
their efforts to rebut the onslaught of accommodating memoranda.7
Re-interpretation—particularly of treaties and of statutes—often 
opens the gateway to political expediency. The world experienced 
this during the ABM Treaty re-interpretation debate of the 1980’s, 
where government lawyers with no background in international law 
re-interpreted a major treaty using rationales that took years to 
correct.8 The Iran-Contra scandal also had its share of re-interpreted 
David S. Addington “helped to shape an August 2002 opinion from the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel that said torture might be justified in some 
cases.” Douglas Jehl, In Cheney’s New Chief, a Bureaucratic Master, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. During his time at the White House, former U.S. Attorney and 
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales produced a memorandum to President 
Bush on the use of alternative interrogation techniques and is considered one of the 
architects of the Bush Administration’s policies towards detainees. R. Jeffrey 
Smith & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Helped Set Course for Detainees, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 5, 2005, at A01. William J. Haynes produced the Department of Defense 
memorandum providing a legal justification for the use of alternative interrogation 
techniques. SANDS, supra note 4, at 3-5. Steven Bradbury wrote a series of 
classified Department of Justice legal memoranda thought to promote the use of 
waterboarding and other alternative interrogation techniques. Scott Shane, 
Waterboarding Focus of Inquiry by Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at 
A1. 
 6. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse 
and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 
(illustrating the close connection between William J. Haynes, the general counsel 
of the Department of Defense, and Vice President Richard Cheney’s chief of staff, 
David Addington). 
 7. See, e.g., id. (detailing the story of Alberto J. Mora, the former general 
counsel of the United States Navy, who consistently voiced his opposition to the 
policies of the Department of Defense and the Bush Administration but was unable 
to overcome the influence of more powerful political figures). 
 8. See David J. Scheffer, Nouveau Law and Foreign Policy, 76 FOREIGN 
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federal statutes.9 More recently—in addition to the torture 
memoranda—political interpreters manipulated the texts of relevant 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq,10 the 2002 law on 
Authorization to Use Military Force,11 and the Geneva Conventions 
of 194912 in order to legitimize a war of choice, authorize highly 
intrusive wiretapping of Americans, and create a novel regime to 
classify and handle combatants with an arrogance towards long-held 
interpretations of the law that invites disbelief.13 Even the 2002 
POL’Y 44, 48-54 (1989) (noting that none of the lawyers interpreting the ABM 
Treaty had specialization in international law and that their subsequent 
interpretation resulted in weakened confidence on behalf of foreign governments 
negotiating with the United States). 
 9. See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 696, 698 (1987) (detailing five statutes reinterpreted during the Iran-
Contra Scandal: the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 
1979, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the National Security Act of 1947, and 
the Hostage Act of 1868). 
 10. Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 688, promulgated in 1991 
during the first Gulf War, formed the basis of the Joint Resolution to Authorize the 
Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, issued on Oct. 2, 2002, which 
permitted the U.S. to use military force against Iraq. Press Release, The White 
House, George W. Bush, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States 
Armed Forces Against Iraq (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html. For the text of the resolutions, 
see S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 
1991). Security Council Resolution 1373 prohibited U.N. member states from 
providing material or financial support to terrorists, and Security Council 
Resolution 1441 found Iraq in violation of its responsibilities to comply with its 
disarmament obligations and provided for oversight of disarmament by U.N. and 
IAEA authorities. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. 
Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
 11. See PAUST, supra note 4, at 91-92 (arguing that the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force, contrary to the Bush Administration’s interpretation, authorized 
the use of force only for acts committed prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks). 
For the text of the Authorization, see Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of 
United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (2002). 
 12. See THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN 
IRAQ 239-40 (2006) (noting that even the authors of the memoranda 
recommending alternative interrogation techniques acknowledged that some 
countries may argue that they may be in violation of the Geneva Conventions). 
 13. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER 11-14 (2006) (underscoring that rather than a “carefully reasoned legal 
judgment,” the Bush Administration’s position on the rights of detainees was an 
unprecedented legal position with no base in domestic or international law); 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 144 (highlighting the conclusion by the Department 
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel that a 1994 statute criminalizing torture 
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Article 98(2) bilateral non-surrender agreements between the United 
States and nations joining the International Criminal Court suffer 
from the Bush Administration’s re-interpretation of the Rome 
Statute.14 The idea that Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute was 
intended by the negotiators, who included Prince Zeid and me, to 
cover any and all nationals of a State (such as mercenaries, private 
contractors, tourists, journalists, and business travelers), rather than 
only the official personnel of the “sending State,” which in treaty law 
has a very clear meaning, reflects the kind of overreaching that 
political re-interpreters practice.15
Re-interpretation tactics are fodder for much academic discourse. 
Legal scholars debate the merits of the conventional interpretation 
against the freshly-minted unconventional interpretation.16 But it is 
exceptionally tempting to essentially re-write the law in order to 
achieve politically expedient ends—and lawyers are the authors of 
the process from start to finish. While Prince Zeid was stationed in 
Croatia with U.N. peacekeepers from 1994 to 1996, I spent the first 
term of the Clinton Administration in the Situation Room of the 
White House as an official representing the U.S. Mission to the 
violated the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers under the Constitution, 
thereby justifying non-compliance); PAUST, supra note 4, at 20-21 (asserting that 
because the Constitution and the courts require that the president uphold customary 
international law, the Department of Justice memos justifying such violations were 
unfounded and unprofessional distortions of the law). 
 14. See David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America’s Original 
Intent, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 337-46 (2005) (contending that the original 
intent of the U.S. was to preserve the effect of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) 
and status of missions agreements (SOMAs), which guide criminal investigations 
and prosecution of government personnel abroad, rather than provide protection to 
all U.S. nationals). 
 15. See id. at 347 (explaining that the International Law Commission, in 
commenting on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, defined a “sending 
State” as the state which a consulate represents in a foreign jurisdiction, implying 
that those protected by the sending state are government officials and not nationals, 
as the Bush Administration argued). 
 16. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and 
the Rule of Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 188 (2001) (recognizing two primary 
practices for interpreting treaties in the United States, a unitary approach based 
solely on the intent of the parties and a dual approach based on intent and foreign 
relations law); Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty 
Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25, 28 (2005) (recognizing the inherent tension 
between the United States Department of State and the International Court of 
Justice over treaty interpretations as well as the debate over which interpretation 
should be followed by U.S. courts). 
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United Nations on the Deputies Committee of the National Security 
Council. I emerged from that experience frustrated enough to 
speculate—perhaps foolishly—about an American foreign policy 
grounded in the enforcement of international law and the 
advancement of the nation’s global rather than solely national 
interests. That would require some fundamental shifts in how our 
foreign policy is conceived, strategized, implemented, and defended. 
It would require a real commitment to assertive multilateralism, a 
term I proposed to my boss, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, in 
1993, to the unending shock of certain Members of Congress and 
commentators who kept interchanging “assertive” as “aggressive.”17 
Perhaps a re-born assertive multilateralism, whereby the U.S. 
Government would more effectively use its influence and power 
within international institutions and among newly carved coalitions 
of nations to achieve collective responses to global challenges, would 
help salvage what is left of our foreign policy after the last seven 
years. 
But such visions are difficult even when political expediency is 
dictated by leaders whom you, as a lawyer, strongly believe should 
hold positions of governmental power. During the Clinton 
Administration, I witnessed many policy decisions that distanced the 
United States from opportunities to advance noble principles of 
international law. As with other administrations, the State 
Department’s regional political bureaus exercised paramount 
influence in Clinton-era policy discussions, as did the Pentagon and 
the National Security Council. Political expediency, if we understand 
it to mean the primacy of political machinations over objective legal 
reasoning—particularly where the enforcement of law truly 
matters—disastrously crippled America’s response to the Rwandan 
genocide,18 blocked any serious effort to achieve Russian 
 17. See Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Sec’y of State, Myths of Peace-Keeping, 
Statement before the Subcomittee on International Security, International 
Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Jun. 24, 1993), in DEP’T ST. DISPATCH, June 1993 (underscoring that in an era of 
“multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within collective bodies” assertive 
multilateralism through preventive diplomacy and intervention in failing states is 
necessary to maintain international peace and security). 
 18. See David J. Scheffer, A Look Back: Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide, 
5 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 125, 126 (2004) (acknowledging the multiple domestic and 
international political issues that prevented the United States and the United 
Nations from responding effectively to the Rwandan genocide); SAMANTHA 
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accountability for the atrocity crimes unleashed in Chechnya,19 and 
held U.S.-Turkish relations hostage to the historical significance of 
the atrocities suffered by Armenians during the early Twentieth 
Century.20 It thwarted effective measures to apprehend indicted 
fugitives Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic in the Balkans, 
prevented the introduction of NATO ground forces to Kosovo when 
they were desperately needed, and prohibited strong diplomatic 
pressure on Zimbabwian President Robert Mugabe to extradite 
former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam to Addis Ababa to 
stand trial for his atrocity crimes. Political expediency, often 
translated as American exceptionalism, was not unknown to 
American lawyers—myself included—negotiating the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court and its supplemental 
documents.21
 
I agree with Prince Zeid that the victims hold the keys to whether 
a society will restore itself following atrocities. They are the central 
purpose for why the International Criminal Court exists. As he says, 
POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 329-90 
(2002) (describing U.S. response to the early signs of the Rwandan genocide as 
uninformed and slow because the U.S. did not perceive Rwanda as a national 
security threat); JOHN SHATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS WARS & 
AMERICA’S RESPONSE 21-76 (2003) (arguing that the Clinton Administration failed 
to respond adequately to the crisis in Rwanda because the Administration viewed 
the conflict through the lens of the Cold War, in which involvement was only 
necessary to protect strategic interests, and because the Administration 
misconstrued the lessons learned from the failed intervention in Somalia). 
 19. See Human Rights Watch, Who’s Afraid of Vladimir Putin?, Sept. 23, 
2003, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/09/25/whos-afraid-vladimir-putin 
(suggesting that U.S. policy toward Russia is guided by its desire to acquire an ally 
in the war on terror, to maintain good relations with Russian leadership, and to 
gain support within the international community). 
 20. See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu & Sabrina Tavernise, Turkey Authorizes Troops to 
Enter Iraq to Fight Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at A10 (underscoring the 
connection between U.S. non-recognition of the Armenian genocide, U.S.-Turkish 
relations, and U.S. military strategy in Iraq). 
 21. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal 
Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 53-55 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002) (recognizing that 
despite U.S. opposition to the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court 
as against U.S. national interests, the United States stands to gain from ratifying 
the Rome Statute given the protections it would provide to U.S. personnel and the 
voice it would be granted in shaping the application of the Statute). 
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“[W]e build a criminal court for the victims. . .”22 I would temper his 
points with some further reflections. Representatives of victims may 
assume significant roles during prosecutions before the ICC and, 
indeed, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
where former senior Khmer Rouge leaders appear destined to face 
trial soon.23 But the ICC can offer only the possibility of restorative 
justice with reparations, if any, paid out of a convicted defendant’s 
assets or from the court’s trust fund.24
No one can say whether retributive justice trumps restorative 
justice or vice versa in the mind of any particular victim. We do 
know that the ICC is primarily a court of retribution against 
individual perpetrators and, despite the unprecedented focus put on 
the issue, only secondarily is it a court designed to address the 
interests and needs of the victims.25 The ICC cannot, indeed must 
not, be burdened with the overwhelming restorative needs of the 
victims. As my colleagues from the Criminal Division of the Justice 
Department repeatedly counseled me during the ICC negotiations,
 22. Zeid, supra note 3, at 657. 
 23. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 323-341 (2007) (outlining the protections provided to victims in 
international criminal tribunals to make sure that their concerns and claims are 
adequately enumerated). See generally David Boyle, The Rights of Victims: 
Participation, Representation, Protection, Reparation, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 307 
(2006) (detailing the protections and opportunities for victim participation in the 
proceedings of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers). 
 24. See SCHABAS, supra note 23, at 337-41 (2007) (recognizing that although 
the ICC is empowered to make a determination of damages and to order 
reparations, the reparations ordered may come only from an individual—no order 
may be issued against a state). 
 25. See Christine Chung, Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal 
Court: Are Concessions of the Bench Fulfilling the Promise? 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 459, 461 (2008) (discussing an ICC case in which the judge warned of the 
potential impacts of broadening victims’ participation in light of the “fundamental 
principles of criminal law,” which “do not link the status of the victim and 
consequent rights of participation to the charges confirmed against the accused”); 
Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues, 
3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 345, 346-47 (2003) (noting that in the first international 
criminal tribunal statutes, neither the word “victim” nor rights of such a person 
were mentioned). 
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the Court cannot become a welfare agency, which is a cynical but 
perhaps accurate point of view. 
However, Prince Zeid’s focus on the victims is entirely 
appropriate. I believe the yawning gap in how the international 
community has addressed the needs of victims of atrocity crimes 
arises most prominently amongst governments. Our distinguished 
colleague and former president of this Society, Professor Tom 
Franck, eloquently addressed the need to refocus our attention on 
state responsibility and I lodge a similar plea today.26
We begin, though, by recognizing that what has transpired in The 
Hague, Arusha, and Freetown, defendant by defendant, has created 
an impressive body of jurisprudence that already has transformed 
international criminal law and should aid the goals of deterrence 
during the Twenty-First Century.27 The ICC’s true value is in its 
capacity, ideally, to help prevent atrocity crimes in order to save 
millions from experiencing the fate of victims already brought low 
by the violence and destruction that define such international crimes. 
But what of the aftermath? Despite the work of the International Law 
Commission in preparing the draft articles on state responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts,28 no normative basis exists for state 
responsibility towards victims of atrocity crimes, whereby judgments 
of guilt arising from the ICC can be translated into the responsibility 
of the governments that hoisted the perpetrators onto the battlefields 
or the killing fields.29
 26. See generally Thomas Franck, Individual Criminal Liability and Collective 
Civil Responsibility: Do They Reinforce or Contradict One Another? 6 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567 (2007) (positing that state responsibility for acts of 
genocide must be recognized despite trends towards holding only individuals 
accountable). 
 27. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 44 (2006) 
(underscoring that although the law guiding the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda differs, 
the decisions of both courts will play a significant role in guiding the International 
Criminal Court). 
 28. See generally U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23-June 1 
and Jul. 2-Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Report on the Work of the 53d Session] 
(enumerating the draft provisions concerning state responsibility for violations of 
international law as well as the concerns of the drafters). 
 29. See David Scheffer, The World Court’s Fractured Ruling on Genocide, 2 
GENOCIDE STUD. AND PREVENTION 123 (2007). 
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Restorative justice for the victims may begin in the courtroom, but 
it will be achieved within these devastated societies only if the 
executive and legislative branches of governments are obligated by 
treaty or compelled by moral suasion to bear the requisite costs 
associated with the victims. I have no easy formula for achieving this 
objective. For there can be no return to the punitive reparations that 
so crippled Germany after World War I and that Adolf Hitler 
exploited to stoke the misery and pride of his nation for his own 
aggressive and genocidal aims.30 One of the next great challenges in 
our profession will be determining how to transform the remarkable 
progress in individual criminal responsibility achieved during the last 
fifteen years by the international criminal tribunals into a more 
obligatory role by the same governments who ordered these 
atrocities. How can international criminal law be used to compel 
governments to comply with international law as well as to accept 
their own responsibility for the needs of the victims against whom 
their own leaders are proven to have waged atrocity crimes? More 
often than not the perpetrator government will have few if any 
resources to share with the victims in the aftermath of war or a 
campaign of atrocities.31 So our challenge is steep and complex in its 
ramifications, but we must set our sights on it. 
As a modest initial step, I would suggest examining the merits of a 
non-binding General Assembly resolution which would express the 
common view of the international community that where the political 
or military leaders of a nation are convicted by the International 
Criminal Court, that nation should voluntarily shoulder some
 30. See RODERICK STACKELBERG, HITLER'S GERMANY: ORIGINS, 
INTERPRETATIONS, LEGACIES 241 (1999) (recognizing the steep decline in the 
standard of living in Germany, characterized by malnutrition, starvation, and 
disease, resulting from policies seeking to demilitarize Germany as well as the 
expulsion of Germans from other European states); JACKSON J. SPIELVOGEL, 
HITLER AND NAZI GERMANY: A HISTORY 10-28 (1988) (detailing the political, 
economic, and social issues in Weimar Germany that facilitated Hitler’s rise and 
the popularity of his racist and anti-Semitic policies). 
 31. Cf. Irene Melup, The United Nations Declaration on Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 59-60 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 1999) 
(detailing U.N. recommendations for implementing the United Nations Declaration 
on Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and noting that 
most states lack the resources for implementation). 
676 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:665 
 
responsibility, within the limits of its capabilities, towards the needs 
of the victims of the atrocity crimes.32
I conclude with some comments on the fate of amnesties and the 
denial of impunity represented by Article 27 of the Rome Statute. 
Prince Zeid correctly signals the demise of amnesties and the 
unprecedented commitment of Article 27, but I would offer the 
following clarification.33 The end of impunity, and hence the end of 
amnesties fortifying impunity, has arrived for political and military 
leaders who commit atrocity crimes. I do not mean to suggest that 
impunity will not be realized by such leaders in the future or that 
national amnesties will not be negotiated to secure their withdrawal 
from public life. We can expect many atrocity lords to enjoy 
impunity for years to come in the real world outside these walls. The 
ICC is not a court of universal jurisdiction34 and, as we were 
reminded by the International Court of Justice in the Yerodia case, 
head of state and diplomatic immunity remain powerful shields to 
accountability before foreign criminal courts and in the absence of 
obligations arising from participation in an international criminal 
tribunal.35
But the die has been cast. Each and every political and military 
leader is on notice of the actual or potential reach of the law, that 
policy-making and military strategizing cannot proceed in a vacuum 
from legal consequences, and that the world is watching more 
intently every day. Those leaders intimidated by this emerging reality 
are most likely to seek refuge in re-interpretations of the law, in 
exceptionalism, territorial isolation, or in the sheer clout of their 
 32. See Franck, supra note 28, at 571 (contending that states should assume 
their burden of reconstituting victims regardless of whether individuals are held 
liable for genocide as an essential part of the healing process). 
 33. See Zeid, supra note 3, at 660 (recognizing the importance of the Article 
27, which precludes officials from signatory states from avoiding liability based on 
official status, in moving away from the practice of granting amnesty to those 
committing atrocity crimes). 
 34. But see SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 27, at 60 (recognizing that “genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, . . . the core crimes of the Rome Statute” are commonly thought to be 
crimes of universal jurisdiction). 
 35. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 14, 2002) (holding that Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was entitled to 
diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law, despite 
Belgium’s issuance of an arrest warrant). 
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nation’s power on a regional or global stage.36 But those tactics 
increasingly will be seen for what they are and judged against the 
Article 27 standard of accountability. 
We also should recognize that amnesties still fulfill a function in 
societies that cannot possibly bring to justice the thousands, 
sometimes hundreds of thousands, of low-level foot soldiers 
(military and civilian) who are the direct perpetrators of the crimes, 
who determine the fate of each victim.37 Sometimes such amnesties 
are heavily conditioned with confessional and punitive options, as 
well as with obligations to join with others in restorative justice. 
They should be distinguished from leadership amnesties which 
remain so tempting to the peace negotiators but which are 
incompatible with international justice. 
The fact that States Parties to the Rome Statute have embraced 
Article 27 is a testament to civilization in our time. I am only one 
voice, but I hope, for the love of country and of international 
criminal law, that the United States of America has the courage to 
join at least 106 other nations at the ICC in burying impunity along 
with the violence, death, and destruction that the shield of impunity 
has unleashed on countless victims, so many of whom seek to 
survive and, as Secretary Albright often reflected, simply live normal 
lives. 
Sir Robert Peel, a British prime minister in the Nineteenth 
Century, once exhorted his opponents to “elevate your vision.”38 
Today Prince Zeid elevated our vision to what should be our noblest 
aspirations, and for that, Mr. Ambassador, we express our most 
humble gratitude. 
 
 36. See Benjamin G. Davis, A Citizen Observer’s View of the U.S. Approach to 
the War on Terror, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465, 477 (2008) 
(describing the approach of the United States to international law as one based on 
the “exercise of raw power politics on the international plane”). 
 37. See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2007) (recognizing that state leaders often use 
amnesties to compensate for a lack of capacity to prosecute the high numbers of 
perpetrators, as a way to halt ongoing human rights violations, and as a way to 
move the peace process forward). 
 38. William Gladstone, You Cannot Fight Against the Future, in THE PENGUIN 
BOOK OF HISTORIC SPEECHES 311 (Brian MacArthur ed., 1996). 
